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Abstract
The value of information and the possibility of speculation are examined in an
environment with unawareness. Although agents have \correct" prior beliefs about
events they are aware of and have a clear understanding of their available actions and
payos, their unawareness may lead them to commit information processing errors and
to behave suboptimally. As a result, more information is not always valuable and
agents can speculate with each other. We identify two specic information processing
errors that are responsible for both problems. Moreover, we construct a dynamic
model where agents announce their posteriors and update their awareness as soon as
they hear a counterfactual announcement. We study how awareness is updated and
whether agreement about posteriors is reached.
1 Introduction
Consider an agent who is contemplating investing in the stock market today. His payo
is determined by the prices of shares tomorrow, and his particular buy and sell orders.
The agent is aware of all his possible actions (investments) and all the possible prices
of the shares.
Suppose now that there are other contingencies, expressed by questions, which
indirectly inuence the prices of shares tomorrow, and therefore the agent's payo.
Examples of such questions are whether there will be a merger, what are the charac-
teristics of a new CEO or whether an innovation will be announced. The agent may be
aware of some of these questions, and unaware of others. Being unaware of a question
means that he does not know its answer and he does not know that he does not know.
In other words, he misses some information and at the same time fails to recognize it.
The agent receives some information and some awareness before he chooses his action.
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1Although the agent has an an incomplete understanding of the world and there are
questions that he has never thought about, he nevertheless has correct prior beliefs
about events he is aware of and, within the bounds of his reasoning, he is perfectly ra-
tional. He is aware of all of his possible actions and he does not err when contemplating
their deterministic payo.
In such an environment is information valuable? That is, will the more informed
agent be better o ex ante when compared with a less informed but otherwise identical
agent? In an interactive setting, will agents who share a common prior speculate
against each other? Finally, do agents update their awareness and how?
As subsequent examples show, the value of information can be negative and agents
can speculate. Since unawareness is a mistake of reasoning, this is not surprising. Even
within the context of the standard model of knowledge both of these phenomena can
occur when agents have a non partitional information structure. However, modeling
unawareness explicitly allows us to analyze the nature of these mistakes and distinguish
between those that agents are most likely to commit systematically (because of being
unaware), from those that are random or of no economic interest (like mistakes in
computing one's payo).
We identify two mistakes in reasoning. In order to understand the rst, we need
to interpret awareness as a signal. Depending on which state occurs, the agent re-
ceives some information and awareness signals. Before choosing his action, he excludes
all states which specied dierent information and/or lower awareness. However, he
cannot exclude states describing higher awareness, since he cannot reason beyond his
current level. In other words, he uses his \awareness" signal in an asymmetric way and
this may lead to suboptimal choices.
The second mistake arises when the level of one's awareness is too low. A low level
of awareness means that even though the agent is more informed about events he is
aware of, there are many events that he is unaware of. As he cannot condition his
actions on events he is unaware of, he is more inexible and this comes at a cost. In
an interactive setting, a low level of awareness implies that the agent may make wrong
inferences about the information and actions of others. This is because the agent cannot
reason beyond his awareness and as a result he may miss some connections (theorems)
between events he is aware of and events he unaware of. Unavoidably, he will also be
unaware that others actually know these theorems and therefore underestimate their
knowledge.
This mistake in reasoning can lead to nasty surprises. Suppose that agent 1 is
certain that agent 2 considers a high and a low price equally likely and therefore
he should not oer to buy or sell. How he should react if agent 2 oers to buy?
Since the only source of wrong reasoning about others is his low awareness, he may
attempt to increase or update his own. By constructing a dynamic model where agents
announce their posteriors about an event, we study how awareness is updated and
whether agreement about posteriors (and actions) is reached.
21.1 Related Literature
The value of information has been studied in a variety of settings. Blackwell (1951)
shows that an experiment is more informative if and only if it is more valuable to the
decision maker. Blackwell's theorem fails when the agent is not an expected utility
maximizer, as shown by Safra and Sulganik (1995), Schlee (1991) and Wakker (1988).
The setting that is closest to that of the present paper represents information as a
partition of the state space. If the agent's prior is correct, he updates using Bayes' rule
and chooses an action which maximizes his expected utility, then more information,
measured by a ner partition, makes him better o ex ante. However, a partition is con-
sistent only with an unboundedly rational agent who makes no information processing
errors.
Sher (2005) shows that if the agent has wrong priors and updates nonmonotonically,
then a little more information can be bad, but a lot of information is always good.
Geanakoplos (1989) shows that when the agent has correct priors but a non-partitional
information structure, then it is not always good to know more, unless this structure
satises non-delusion, positive introspection, and nested.
Geanakoplos provides several reasons why agents in his model make information
processing errors. For example, agents may forget, ignore unpleasant information, take
no notice when something does not occur or be unaware. However, as demonstrated
by Dekel et al. (1998), his setting has some limitations if the intention is to model
agents who make information processing errors because of their unawareness.1 Another
limitation is that Geanakoplos only compares an agent who makes some information
processing errors with another agent who is less informed but makes no errors - so
his information is represented by a partition. In this paper we take a more general
approach and allow for any agent, not just the more informed, to be unaware and to
make information processing errors.
By applying the unawareness model provided by Galanis (2007), we are able to
specify what are the mistakes in reasoning that can result in speculative trade and in
negative value of information and address the criticism of Dekel et al. (1998).
The literature on no trade theorems stems from Aumann (1976). Agents trade
either because they have dierent priors or because they make information processing
errors. In the context of the standard model where agents make no mistakes, Morris
(1994), Feinberg (1995, 1996), Samet (1998), Bonanno and Nehring (1996) and Ng
(2003) show that \a necessary and sucient condition for the existence of a common
prior is that there is no bet for which it is always common knowledge that all agents
expect a positive gain". Moreover, Milgrom and Stokey (1982) and Sebenius and
Geanakoplos (1983) show that common priors imply that there cannot be common
knowledge of speculation. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) show that if agents
take turns in announcing their posteriors about an event, they will eventually agree.
Geanakoplos (1989) shows that if we allow for mistakes, agents can speculate, even
with common priors. However, speculation in equilibrium cannot occur, as long as
non-delusion, nested and positive introspection are satised.
1Dekel et al. (1998) show that if unawareness satises three properties they propose, then the standard
state space model can only accommodate trivial unawareness.
3Models of unawareness are either syntactic or semantic. Beginning with Fagin
and Halpern (1988), syntactic models have been provided by Halpern (2001), Modica
and Rustichini (1994, 1999), Halpern and R^ ego (2005), Heifetz et al. (2007b) and
Board and Chung (2007). Geanakoplos (1989) provides one of the rst set-theoretic
models of boundedly rational agents, using the standard framework. Dekel et al. (1998)
argues against the use of a standard state space by proposing three properties for an
unawareness operator. Two approaches overcome this impossibility result. First, by
arguing against one of the properties (Ely (1998)), or by relaxing them (Xiong (2007)).
Second, by introducing multiple state spaces, as in Li (2006), Heifetz et al. (2006) and
Galanis (2007).
The main dierence between the model of Galanis (2007) and those of Heifetz et al.
(2006) and Heifetz et al. (2007b) is that the former allows for knowledge and posteriors
to vary across states that dier only with respect to how expressive they are in terms
of awareness.2 This dierence is crucial in the applications we consider here because
we make the assumption that agents are aware of and make no mistakes about their
actions and payos. Moreover, we concentrate on how agents reason about events that
everyone is aware of. For example, we only study betting about events that everyone
is aware of. If being less aware did not allow for incorrect reasoning about knowledge
and posteriors, then all the results from the standard model would be true here as well.
Applications in the context of games with unawareness have been provided by
Feinberg (2004, 2005), Copic and Galeotti (2007), Li (2006b), Heifetz et al. (2007a),
Filiz (2006), Ozbay (2006), von Thadden and Zhao (2008) and Halpern and R^ ego
(2006).
1.2 Overview of the results
The value of information is analyzed by comparing a more informed agent 2 with a
less informed agent 1. Both have the same preferences, payos, prior, and a correct
understanding of their payos and actions, but may dier in their awareness and in-
formation. In the context of the standard model, agent 2 is more informed than agent
1 if whenever 1 knows an event, 2 knows it as well. In this model we apply the same
denition, but only for events that both are aware of.
Information is valuable if both mistakes in reasoning are addressed. The low level
of awareness is addressed by requiring that whenever agent 1 knows an event E that
2 is unaware of, agent 2 knows another event that logically implies E. Whenever this
happens, we say that 2 is strongly more informed.
For the second mistake we need two properties. The rst, nested awareness, requires
that there exists an ordering of all questions and each agent is aware of a question only
if he is also aware of all the other questions that precede it, according to this order.
The second property, conditional independence, requires that awareness, as a signal,
has no informational value to the decision maker. Conditional independence can be
phrased in terms of an example. Suppose that an agent who considers investing in
a rm were to acquire some private information, that enabled him to consider only
two mutually exclusive scenarios as possible. Either there will be a lawsuit against the
2For details on this dierence see Galanis (2007).
4rm, or the rm will announce a technological breakthrough. Conditional independence
requires that the likelihood that his awareness will increase is not inuenced by whether
the breakthrough or the lawsuit occur. In other words, there is nothing intrinsic in
one of the two events that can change the way his awareness varies. For example, the
property would fail if an innovation meant that the agent most likely becomes aware
of a new dimension, whereas this does not happen with a lawsuit. Hence, we would
expect conditional independence to hold when it is \business as usual" for investors,
and to fail otherwise.
Information is valuable if one of the following is true. First, the strongly more
informed agent 2 satises conditional independence, so that he does not misuse his
awareness signal. Second, agent 1 satises conditional independence and the strongly
more informed agent 2's awareness is nested and more informative.
Trade is analyzed in three dierent settings. Suppose that all agents share a com-
mon prior. Then, there cannot be common knowledge trade. Hence, although agents
may be boundedly rational due to their unawareness, common knowledge of trade is
suciently strong to rule out any such possibility, just like in the standard model with
partitional structures. This result is in contrast with models of bounded reasoning
(Geanakoplos (1989)) and unawareness (Xiong (2007)) that use the standard frame-
work but non-partitional structures, as common knowledge trade is feasible there.
This implies that assigning zero probability to an event is behaviorally distinct from
being unaware of it. Agent who assign probability zero to some events would engage
in common belief belief trade, while unaware agents would not. Interestingly, we also
show that common belief of no trade does not imply that there is no trade, the reason
being that agents may make wrong inferences about others, due to their low level of
awareness. Hence, although agents cannot agree that there are unexploited trading
opportunities, such opportunities may exist, as long as they are beyond the awareness
of some.
Second, conditional independence implies that there does not exist a trade that
provides positive expected gains for everyone, always. That is, as long as agents do
not overestimate or underestimate events due to their varying awareness, a mutually
benecial trade does not exist. Moreover, the reverse does not hold, so that even with
conditional independence, dierent priors do not imply the existence of a mutually
benecial trade. The problem of low awareness is not relevant in this setting because
agents do not need to reason about the actions of others.
Trade in equilibrium cannot occur if each agent satises either conditional indepen-
dence or nested awareness, and his payo is not inuenced by the level of his awareness.
The second condition addresses the issue that, in equilibrium, agents have to reason
about the actions of others. Low level of awareness means that they may reason in-
correctly, so their actual payos may be dierent from their perceived ones, if this
condition is not satised.
In the last part of the paper we study how agents update their awareness, by con-
structing a dynamic model where two agents take turns in announcing their posteriors.
We show that agents eventually agree on their posteriors, just like in the standard
model. Finally, we place lower and upper bounds on how much awareness is updated.
First, the agent updates at all if and only if he becomes aware of something that the
5other is aware of. Second, (under a mild condition) the agent can at most become
aware of everything that the other agent is already aware of. Hence, announcements
transmit awareness between agents.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an example showing that infor-
mation is not always valuable in the presence of unawareness. Section 3 presents an
overview of the model of unawareness of Galanis (2007) and formalizes the conditions
mentioned above. The value of information problem is analyzed in section 4, whereas
the no trade theorems are presented in section 5. In section 6 a dynamic version of the
model is constructed in order to analyze how agents update their awareness. Proofs
are contained in the appendix.
2 Knowing less can be better
In the following example we show that the value of information can be negative in an
environment with unawareness. In particular, we compare two agents who share the
same awareness, payos, action set and prior, but one has more information and he is
strictly worse o.
Everything that is relevant about the world can be described by giving an answer
to the following three questions. Question p, \What is the price of the share?", has
three possible answers: low, medium and high. Question q, \Is there going to be an
acquisition?", and question r, \Is there an innovation going to be adopted?", both have
two possible answers, \yes" and \no".
There are two available actions, buy (B) and not buy (NB). Payos depend only on
the price. More specically, the payo (in utils) is zero if the action is NB, irrespective
of the price. If the action is B then the payo is 1 if the price is high and  1 otherwise.
Therefore, in terms of payos there is no dierence between a low and a medium price.
One can think of a low and a medium price as two distinct bad scenarios.
A full state ! species an answer to all three questions and thus provides a complete
description of the world. Let 
 denote the full state space, the collection of full states,
and let  be a prior on 
. The full state space contains the following three full states:
!
1 = (pl;qy;rn); (!
1) = 0:3;
!
2 = (pm;qn;ry); (!
3) = 0:3;
!
3 = (ph;qy;ry); (!
2) = 0:4:
Note that although payos depend only on prices, information about the other two
questions can help an agent make a better decision. For example, if an agent knew
that there is no acquisition (qn), he would understand that the price is medium (pm)
and therefore he would choose NB.
Suppose now that both agents are always aware of questions p and q, while they
are aware of question r if and only if state !
3 occurs. Being unaware of question r
means that you do not know whether there is an innovation, and you do not know that
you do not know. In other words, the agent completely misses the r dimension and his
view of the world is represented by the following state space 
:
!1 = (pl;qy); !2 = (pm;qn); !3 = (ph;qy):
6However, an unaware agent misses much more than just information about dimen-
sion r. The full state space 
 species that the agent is aware of r if and only if the
price is high. This \fact" is lost in state space 
, because dimension r is absent. In
other words, at !
3, a fully aware agent can reason as follows: \I am aware of all three
questions. Hence, the price is high". But at !
1, an agent who is unaware of r cannot
reason as follows: \I am unaware of r. Hence, the price cannot be high". It turns out
that this asymmetry drives the result that information may not be valuable.
Eectively, when the agent's awareness varies across states, it creates a signal that
the agent can only understand partially. At !
3, the awareness signal partitions the
payo relevant state space as follows: (pl;pm), (ph). But at !
1, !
2, the awareness
signal provides the trivial partition (pl;pm;ph).
Although the two agents are identical in terms of their awareness, payos, priors
and actions, they have dierent information. Suppose that agent 2 has a signal that
always provides an answer to question q. Hence, he is more informed than agent 1. The
following table summarizes the information of each agent about prices at each full state.
Full state Agent 1 Agent 2
!
1 fpl;pm;phg fpl;phg
!
2 fpl;pm;phg fpmg
!
3 fphg fphg
Note that at !
3 both agents use their awareness signal and deduce that the price
is high. At !
1, the less informed agent cannot exclude any states, whereas agent 2 can
use his information signal and exclude that price is medium, since he knows that there
is an acquisition.
Let  be a prior on the full state space 
, such that (!
1) = (!
2) = 0:3 and
(!
3) = 0:4. We assume that whenever the agent has a lower dimensional subjective
state space, his prior is the marginal of  on that state space.3
At full state ! each agent receives his awareness, he constructs his subjective state
space and receives his information. Having a prior on his subjective state space he
updates using Bayes' rule and chooses an action that maximizes his expected utility,
given his information. The following table summarizes each agent's posteriors about
the payo relevant state space (pl;pm;ph) and best action at each full state. For in-
stance, at !
1 agent 2 assigns posterior belief of 3=7 to the price being low, 4=7 to the
price being high and his best action is to buy.
Full state Agent 1 Action Agent 2 Action
!
1 (0:3;0:3;0:4) NB (3=7;0;4=7) B
!
2 (0:3;0:3;0:4) NB (0;1;0) NB
!
3 (0;0;1) B (0;0;1) B
3Every subjective state ! gives an answer to some questions. We assume that the probability assigned to
! is the probability that  assigns to the set of full states which give the same answers as !. For example,
the probability assigned to !1 = (pl;qy) is (!1) = 0:3, because !
1 = (pl;qy;rn) is the only full state which
gives the same answers as !1 and (!
1) = 0:3. Generally, many full states project to each state !.
7The less informed agent 1 always chooses the correct action, since he buys only
when the price is high. On the contrary, the more informed agent 2 makes the wrong
choice of buying when the price is low. The reason is the asymmetry of the awareness
signal: agent 2 is able to use it at !
3 but not at !
1. If the agent was never allowed to
use the signal or he was able to use it always, then more information would always be
benecial.
3 The Model
3.1 Preliminaries
This section presents an overview of the model developed in Galanis (2007).
Consider a complete lattice of disjoint state spaces S = fSaga2A and denote by
 = [a2ASa the union of these state spaces. Throughout, we assume that  is nite.
A state ! is an element of some state space S. Let S be the most complete state
space, the join of all state spaces in S. We call S the full state space. An element
! 2 S is called a full state.
Let  be a partial order on S. For any S, S0 2 S, S  S0 means that S0 is
more expressive than S. Moreover, there is a surjective projection rS0
S : S0 ! S.
Projections are required to commute. If S  S0  S00 then rS00
S = rS0
S  rS00
S0 . If
! 2 S0, denote !S = rS0
S (!) and !S00 = f!1 2 S00 : rS00
S0 (!1) = !g. If E  S0, let
ES = f!S : ! 2 Eg be the restriction of event E to a less expressive state space S and
let ES00 =
S
f!S00 : ! 2 Eg be its enlargement to a more expressive state space S00. Let
g(S) = fS0 : S  S0g be the collection of state spaces that are at least as expressive as
S. For a set E  S, denote by E" =
S
S02g(S)(rS0
S ) 1(E) the enlargements of E to all
state spaces which are at least as expressive as S.
Consider a possibility correspondence P :  ! 2 n; with the following properties:
(0) Connedness: If ! 2 S then P(!)  S0 for some S0  S.
(1) Generalized Reexivity: ! 2 (P(!))" for every ! 2 .
(2) Stationarity: !0 2 P(!) implies P(!0) = P(!).
(3) Projections Preserve Ignorance: If ! 2 S0 and S  S0 then (P(!))"  (P(!S))".
(4) Projections Preserve Awareness: If ! 2 S0, ! 2 P(!) and S  S0 then !S 2
P(!S).
3.1.1 Events, awareness and knowledge
Formally, an event is a pair (E;S), where E  S and S 2 S. The negation of (E;S),
dened by :(E;S) = (S n E;S), is the complement of E with respect to S. Let
E = f(E;S) : E  S;S 2 Sg be the set of all events. We write E as a shorthand for
(E;S) and ;S as a shorthand for (;;S). For each event E, let S(E) be the state space
of which it is a subset. An event E \inherits" the expressiveness of the state space of
which it is a subset. Hence, we can extend  to a partial order 0 on E in the following
way: E 0 E0 if and only if S(E)  S(E0). Abusing notation, we write  instead of
0.
8Before dening belief, we need to dene awareness. For any event E, for any state
space S such that S  E, dene
AS(E) = f! 2 S : E  P(!)g
to be the event which describes, with the vocabulary of S, that the agent is aware of
event E. The agent is aware of an event whenever his possibility set resides in a state
space that is rich enough to express event E. Unawareness is dened as the negation of
awareness. More formally, the event US(E) describes, with the vocabulary of S, that
the agent is unaware of E:
US(E) = :AS(E) = (S n AS(E);S):
Let 
 :  ! S be such that for any ! 2 , 
(!) = S if and only if P(!)  S.

(!) denotes the agent's state space at !. An agent believes an event E if he is aware
of it and in all the states he considers possible, E is true. Formally, for any event E,
for any state space S such that S  E, dene
BS(E) = f! 2 AS(E) : P(!)  E
(!)g:
3.2 Information
In the standard model, more information is represented by a ner partition. Formally,
agent 2 is more informed than agent 1 if P2(!)  P1(!) for all ! 2 
. This is equivalent
to requiring that whenever agent 1 believes an event, agent 2 believes it as well, so that
B1(E)  B2(E) for all events E  
, where B is the standard belief operator.
In an environment with unawareness these two denitions are not equivalent. In
particular, B1
S(E)  B2
S(E) for all events E is equivalent to the property that
P2(!)S  P1(!)S and 
1(!)  
2(!) for all ! 2 S. That is, \having more
information" according to the rst property is equivalent to \considering fewer states
to be possible and being more aware", as described by the second property.
In order to disentangle information from awareness we will consider two weaker
properties. The rst compares the agents' partitions in the \highest" state space that
both are aware of.
Denition 1. P2 is weakly more informed than P1 if P2(!)S!  P1(!)S! for all
! 2 S, where S! = 
1(!) ^ 
2(!).
Recall that P2(!)S! is the projection of 2's information at ! to state space S!,
which is the meet (greatest lower bound) of the agents' state spaces at !. As the
following Lemma shows, this property is equivalent to requiring that whenever agent
1 believes an event that 2 is aware of, then 2 believes it as well. Hence, this property
compares the agents' beliefs only about events that both are aware of.
The second property compares the agents' information in the full (most complete)
state space S.
Denition 2. P2 is strongly more informed than P1 if P2(!)S  P1(!)S for all
! 2 S.
9Recall that P2(!)S is the enlargement (opposite of restriction) of 2's information
at ! to the full state space. As the following Lemma shows, this property is equivalent
to requiring that 2 is weakly more informed than 1 and whenever agent 1 believes an
event E that 2 is unaware of, then 2 believes another event E0 that logically implies E.
Formally, event E0 logically implies E if E0
S  ES. Hence, this property compares
the agents' beliefs on events that at least one is aware of.
Below we enumerate the aforementioned properties. The following Lemma summa-
rizes the relations between them.
1. For all events E, B1
S(E)  B2
S(E).
2. For all events E, B1
S(E) \ A2
S(E)  B2
S(E).
3. For any event E, there is event E0 such that B1
S(E) \ U2
S(E)  B2
S(E0) and
E0
S  ES.
4. P2(!)S!  P1(!)S! for all ! 2 S, where S! = 
1(!) ^ 
2(!).
5. P2(!)S  P1(!)S for all ! 2 S.
6. 
1(!)  
2(!) for all ! 2 S.
Lemma 1.
 (1) () (5) and (6),
 (1) () (2) and (6),
 (4) () (2),
 (5) () (2) and (3).
Properties 2, 3, 4 and 5 compare the agents' information without specifying any-
thing about their awareness. On the other hand, property 6 compares the agents'
awareness without implying anything about their information. Finally, property 1
compares both information and awareness.
3.3 Awareness
Here we group three properties about the agent's awareness. The rst requires that
awareness is ordered. Formally, an agent's awareness at a full state is either more or
less expressive than his awareness at any other full state.
Denition 3. [Nested awareness] Awareness for P is nested if for all !;!
1 2 S,
either 
(!)  
(!
1) or 
(!
1)  
(!).
This is equivalent to having a partial order on the collection of all state spaces, so
that the agent is aware of a state space S only if he is also aware of all states spaces
S0 that precede it, according to this order. Nested awareness is closely related to the
property nested, discussed in Geanakoplos (1989).
For the next two properties we need the following denition. Let
E(!) = f!
1 2 S : 
(!) = 
(!
1)g
10be the event of the full state space describing that the agent has the same awareness
as ! describes. Function E partitions the full state space S and provides a signal
that the agent can only partially comprehend. If one's awareness varies a lot across
states, then his signal is more informative (the partition on 
 generated by E is ner).
However, this does not mean that he can \use" this information properly since he only
understands the signal partially, as he is not aware of the full state space. This notion
is formalized by the following denition.
Denition 4. Awareness for P1 is more informative than for P2 if for all ! 2 S,
E1(!)  E2(!).
The following property requires that conditional on receiving one's private informa-
tion, P(!), the event describing the agent's awareness, E(!), is independent of any
other event he is aware of.
Denition 5. [Conditional independence] (P;) satises conditional independence
if for any ! 2 S with (!) > 0, for any E  
(!),
(ESjP(!)S) = (ESjE(!) \ P(!)S):45
Conditional independence species that awareness, as a signal, has no informational
value. In other words, beliefs conditional on the information signal P are identical to
beliefs conditional on P and the awareness signal E. Conditional independence implies
that an unaware agent cannot misuse his awareness signal, because it provides no
information at all. Note that nested awareness and conditional independence use the
full state space S. Hence, the agent cannot, in principle, check whether he satises
these conditions. Moreover, if the agent's awareness is constant across states, then
both conditional independence and nested awareness are satised.
4 The value of information
Let C be a set of possible actions and dene u : C   ! R to be the agent's utility
function. When the agent is aware of a state !, his perception of his payo at ! if
he chooses action c is u(c;!). But ! may be a coarse description of the world. We
will assume that the agent does not err when contemplating the consequences of his
actions. That is, he is always aware of the payo relevant state space. Let S0 =
V
S
be the meet of all the agent's subjective states.
Assumption 1. For all ! 2 , u(c;!S0) = u(c;!) for all c 2 C.
The assumption states that in terms of payos, only S0 matters. Hence, if two
states !, !0 project to the same state !00 2 S0, (i.e. !S0 = !0
S0 = !00) then they assign
the same payo for every action. Since the agent is always aware of S0, he has a correct
understanding of his payos for each action. This assumption is consistent with the
4The set ES contains all full states that project to E, while P(!)S contains all full states that project
to P(!). Hence, ES is the event `E occurs', while P(!)S is the event `P(!) occurs'.
5This is equivalent to (E(!) \ ESjP(!)S) = (E(!)jP(!)S)(ESjP(!)S).
11story, outlined in the example, of an agent who invests in the stock market and has a
clear understanding of the payos of his buy and sell orders, as they only depend on
prices. Although there are many factors that could inuence his payos (a merger, an
innovation, a lawsuit), this can only happen through prices. This assumption is similar
to that made in Morris (1994), where signals are not payo relevant.
A decision problem is a tuple (C;;P;u;) where C is the action set,  is the union
of all state spaces, P is the agent's possibility correspondence, u is his utility function
and  is a prior on S.
Suppose that the agent is partially aware and his subjective state space is 
. We
will assume that although the agent is unaware of S and of , he nevertheless has
correct beliefs about events that he is aware of. If he had \wrong" beliefs, then more
information could harm him even in the absence of unawareness. Hence, we require
that his prior on 
 is the marginal of  on 
, denoted by j
. For every ! 2 
,
j
(!) =
P
!2!S
(!), where !S is the set of full states that project to !.
A decision function f maps each full state ! 2 S to a specic action c 2 C. The
agent chooses his best action by maximizing his expected value, given his information.
Denition 6. A decision function f : S ! C is optimal for the decision problem
(C;;P;u;) if and only if
1. For all !;!
1 2 S, P(!) = P(!
1) =) f(!) = f(!
1).
2. For all ! 2 S and c 2 C,
X
!2P(!)
u(f(!);!)j
(!)(!) 
X
!2P(!)
u(c;!)j
(!)(!):
The rst condition states that if two full states describe the same awareness and
beliefs, then the agent chooses the same action. The second condition says that once
the agent receives his awareness and his information, he updates his beliefs using Bayes'
law and chooses the action that maximizes his expected utility given his information.
A decision problem is more valuable than another if each decision function guarantees
a higher ex ante expected utility.
Denition 7. Decision problem A = (C;;P;u;) is more valuable than decision
problem B = (C0;;Q;u0;0) if whenever g is optimal for A and f is optimal for B,
we have X
!2S
u(g(!);!)(!) 
X
!2S
u0(f(!);!)0(!):
4.1 Results
In the standard framework with partitional information structures, a partition P2 is
ner than P1 if and only if it is more valuable for all , u and C (Laont (1989)). The
following Theorem summarizes the sucient conditions for information to be valuable
in an environment with unawareness.
Theorem 1. Suppose that P2 is strongly more informed than P1. Decision problem
(C;;P2;u;) is more valuable than (C;;P1;u;) if one of the following is true:
121. (P2;) satises conditional independence, or,
2. (P1;) satises conditional independence and awareness for P2 is nested and
more informative.
Moreover, whenever one of the properties is violated there exist u;C; where all other
properties are satised and (C;;P1;u;) is strictly more valuable than (C;;P2;u;).
Recall that agent 2 is strongly more informed if whenever agent 1 believes an event
E, then if agent 2 is aware of E he believes it as well, or, if he is unaware of it, he
believes another event E0 that logically implies E. Hence, a low level of awareness can
be compensated by a high level of information. The rst part of the Theorem species
that if the more informed agent 2 does not misuse his awareness signal, information is
valuable. If, on the other hand, the less informed agent 1 does not misuse his signal,
then information is still valuable provided 2's awareness is nested and more informative.
One reason why the converse can fail to be true is that the payo relevant state
space S0 may contain too few states. For example, it may be that the only two states
that describe dierent information and awareness for the two agents project to the same
payo relevant state. In that case, dierences in information do not imply dierences
in payos. We say that S0 is non-degenerate for information structure P if whenever
two states are distinguishable according to P, they can be distinguished also in terms
of payos.
Denition 8. [Non-degeneracy] The payo relevant state space S0 is non-degenerate
for P if for all ! 2 S, !;!0 2 P(!) and ! 6= !0 imply !S0 6= !0
S0.
Under the assumption of non-degeneracy, the following Proposition shows that a
necessary condition for an information structure to be more valuable is to be weakly
(but not strongly) more informed.
Proposition 1. Suppose that for all u;;C, decision problem (C;;P2;u;) is more
valuable than (C;;P1;u;). If S0 is non-degenerate for P2 then P2 is weakly more
informed.
5 Speculation
Speculation is examined in three dierent settings. Both information processing errors
outlined above are relevant here but for dierent reasons. A low level of awareness
is responsible for leading agents to make wrong inferences about the information of
others. Hence, existing trading opportunities, if they are beyond one's awareness, can
be left unexplored. Below we provide such an example where although it is common
beliefs that there should be no trade, such a trade exists. However, under common
priors, common beliefs of trade cannot occur. That is, unaware agents are rational
enough to exhaust all trading possibilities that can be described within their common
awareness.
Consider the following example of two agents with constant but dierent awareness.
The agent with the low level of awareness makes false inferences about the other agent's
information and actions. There are two questions, concerning the possible prices and
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Figure 1: Low level of awareness allows for speculative trade
interest rates, each with two possible answers, \high" and \low". State space S0 =
f!5;!6g species whether prices are high or low, whereas state space S = f!1;!2;!4g
species whether prices and interest rates are high or low. Agent 1 is always aware of
both dimensions, and he always gets information about interest rates. Moreover, he
believes a theorem that states \low interest rates imply high prices".6 Hence, when
interest rates are low, he believes that prices are high. Agent 1's information is as
follows. P1(!1) = P1(!2) = f!1;!2g, P1(!4) = f!4g, P1(!5) = P1(!6) = f!5;!6g.
On the other hand, agent 2 is only aware of prices. Since he is unaware of interest
rates and of the theorem, he never believes whether prices are high or low. His state
space is S0 and his information is represented by the coarsest partition of S0; for all
! 2  = S [ S0, P1(!) = S0.
The fact that agent 2's awareness is constant implies that he does not underestimate
or overestimate the occurrence of any event. However, the low level of his awareness
leads to wrong reasoning about agent 1's information. Since he is unaware of the
theorem, he falsely concludes that also agent 1 is always unable to believe when prices
are high or low. In other words, agent 2 thinks that 1's information is given by P1(!5) =
P1(!6) = S0. The information structure of both agents is depicted in Figure 1.
Agent i's posterior at ! 2  about event E  
i(!) is given by ti(!;E). A
probability distribution on the full state space S is a prior for i if it generates his
posteriors.
Denition 9. A prior for agent i is a probability distribution  2 S such that for
each ! 2 , if (Pi(!)S) > 0, then ti(!;E) = j
(!)(EjPi(!)) for each E  
(!).
Both agents share a common prior  on S, where (!1) = 1=2, (!2) = 1=4, and
(!4) = 1=4.7 Since agent 2 is always unaware of S, his posteriors are derived from
the marginal of  on S0.
6Hence, the state !3, \low interest rates, low prices", is impossible.
7Since !3 is impossible we do not include it in the state space S.
14A bet is only dened in the common state space S0 and generates, at each state
! 2 S0, gains and losses that add up to zero.
Denition 10. A bet b is a collection of functions bi : S0 ! R, one for each agent
i, such that for each ! 2 S0,
P
i2I
bi(!) = 0. Agent i expects positive gain from bet b at
! 2 S if
P
!2
i(!)
ti(!;!)bi(!S0) > 0.
Recall that the payo relevant state space S0 is the meet of all state spaces: S0 =
V
S.
In this interactive setting, this implies that it is always common belief that everyone
is aware of S0 and of any bet dened on S0.8
Note that at !5;!6 both agents have identical posteriors. Hence, at both !5 and
!6 there is no bet from which both agents expect positive gains. Moreover, the event
S0 = f!5;!6g is common belief at !4, which means that it is common belief that there
is no trade. However, this is true only within the limited state space S0. For example,
if b1(!5) =  1:1, b1(!6) = 0:9, b2 =  b1, then both agents expect positive gains at !4.
But this reasoning is above agent 2's awareness.
Another observation is that there does not exist a bet that makes both agents
expect positive gains always. If such a bet existed, it would specify a positive gain for
agent 1 at !6, because at !4 he assigns probability 1 to !6. But b1(!6) > 0 implies
b2(!6) < 0, b2(!5) > 0, b1(!5) < 0, and there is no such bet that would make both
agents expect positive gains at !1.
Finally, suppose that at !4 agent 1 announces that his posterior about !6 is 1. This
is a totally unexpected announcement from the perspective of agent 2, who thinks that
the posterior of both agents is 1/2. How will he react? We answer this question
in section 6, by constructing a dynamic model of updating awareness, whereas we
generalize the observations described above in the following section.
5.1 Results
The example above shows that although agents can exhaust trading opportunities that
can be described within their common awareness, trading opportunities can still exist.
The following result shows that with common priors, there cannot be common belief
trade. Hence, unaware agents are rational enough to understand that common belief
of trade exhausts all trading opportunities within their common awareness, just like in
the context of the standard model of beliefs with partitional informational structures.9
Theorem 2. If at ! 2 S it is common belief that there is a bet b from which all
agents expect positive gains, then there is no common prior.
This is in contrast with models of unawareness (Xiong (2007)) and bounded reason-
ing (Geanakoplos (1989)) that employ the standard framework, where common belief
8Formally, for all ! 2 S, it is commonly believed that everyone is aware of S0. For denitions of
common belief and common belief of awareness, see Galanis (2007).
9An example of common belief trade with common priors but non partitional information structures is
provided in the appendix.
15trade is possible. Moreover, if we were to model unawareness of an event by assigning
zero probability to that event, then \unaware" agents would engage in common belief
(belief) trade. Hence, this result provides a behavioral implication which distinguishes
the present model from standard state space models of bounded reasoning. Note that
no common belief trade has also been shown by Heifetz et al. (2007a) and by Galanis
(2007) (in the form of the agreeing to disagree result).
The next question is whether we can have a trade that always guarantees positive
expected gains for everyone. In the context of the standard model where agents make
no mistakes, non existence of such a trade is characterized by the existence of a common
prior. Since anything that is always true is always common belief, common priors are
equivalent to not having a bet for which it is always common beliefs that it is benecial
in expectation for everyone.
If we allow for unawareness, then this result is false. First, what is always true is
not always common beliefs. The reason is that if one is not fully aware, he may fail to
realize that something is always true.10 Second, as in the value of information problem,
agents may overestimate or underestimate the occurrence of events depending on how
their awareness varies. The following result shows that if the priors of all agents satisfy
conditional independence, then they can trade only if they have dierent priors. Third,
the converse does not hold. Even in the presence of conditional independence, dierent
priors do not imply trade.
Theorem 3. Suppose that the priors of all agents satisfy conditional independence and
there is a bet b for which all agents always expect a positive gain. Then, there is no
common prior. However, no common prior and conditional independence do not imply
the existence of such a bet b.
The third setting is trade in equilibrium. For that, we need to dene the notion of
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in an environment with unawareness. Let I be a nite
set of agents, each having a nite set of actions Ci and let C = 
i2I
Ci denote the set
of all action proles. In the single agent case we dened a decision function to be a
mapping from the full state space S to the set of actions Ci. For the multi agent case
we generalize by dening the domain of the decision function to be the union of all
state spaces .
Denition 11. A Bayesian game with unawareness is a tuple (I;C;;(Pi)i2I;(ti)i2I;(ui)i2I),
where C is the set of all action proles,  is the union of all state spaces, Pi denotes
agent i's possibility correspondence, ui : C   ! R denotes his utility function and ti
his type mapping.
Denition 12. A strategy for player i 2 I is a function fi :  ! Ci such that for all
!;!0 2 , ti(!;) = ti(!0;) implies fi(!) = fi(!0).
Denition 13. Strategies (fi)i2I constitute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if for all
! 2 , all i 2 I and all ci 2 Ci,
10In the example, agent 2 is unaware (hence he does not believe) that agent 1 always believes whether
interest rates are high or low.
16X
!02
i(!)
ui(fi(!0);f i(!0);!0)ti(!;!0) 
X
!02
i(!)
ui(ci;f i(!0);!0)ti(!;!0):
In a Bayesian game with unawareness agents have to reason about the actions of
others, when choosing their own best response. If the level of their awareness is too
low, then they may reason incorrectly about the information and actions of others and
as a result have a wrong perception of their payos. In the example, when !4 occurs
agent 2 incorrectly thinks that agent 1's posterior about !6 is 1. This wrong perception
can lead the agent to choose suboptimal in a game. The following condition species
that an agent's level of awareness does not inuence his perception of his payos.
Denition 14 (Projections Preserve Own Payos). A strategy prole ffigi2I satises
PPOP if for all i 2 I, for all ! 2 , ui(c;f i(!);!) = ui(c;f i(!S0);!S0), for all
c 2 C.
When all equilibria in a game G satisfy PPOP we say that G satises PPOP. Agent
i's ex ante expected utility from strategy prole ffjgj2I is
Ui(ffjgj2I) =
X
!2S
i(!)ui(f(!);!):
Suppose that the agents have arrived at an ex ante Pareto optimal allocation. This
means that each agent can stick to his allocation and can guarantee for himself an
ex ante payo of  ui, irrespective of what everyone else is doing. Moreover, there is
no strategy prole that ex ante can make everyone weakly better o and at least
one strictly better o. Suppose that the agents receive dierential information and
awareness. Will they be willing to trade? As the following theorem shows, the answer
is negative, as long as agents do not misperceive their payos due to their low awareness,
and do misuse their awareness signal.
Theorem 4. Let G be a Bayesian game with unawareness that satises PPOP and sup-
pose that each agent satises either nested awareness or conditional independence. Sup-
pose that each agent i has an action zi 2 Ci such that for all ffjgj2I, Ui([zi];ffjgj2I i) =
 ui. Moreover, suppose that for all ffjgj2I, if Ui(ffjgj2I)   ui for all i 2 I, then
fj(!) = [zj] for all ! 2 S, for all j 2 I. Then, G has a unique equilibrium such
that fi(!) = [zi] for all ! 2 S.
6 Updating awareness
In the example of the previous section the fully aware agent announces an action (bet
on the price being high) that the less aware agent cannot rationalize. As a result, the
second agent realizes that he is missing or he is unaware of \something". How will
he react to this realization? Will he update his awareness until he can rationalize the
announcement? Do announcements reveal awareness, together with information? Will
the agents eventually agree on the action to be taken? Finally, how much they need
to update and towards which direction?
17We answer these questions by constructing a dynamic version of the static model.
The setting is similar to that of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) where two
agents,  and , take turns in announcing their posteriors about an event. An an-
nouncement by agent  transmits public information that enables  to update his own
information and vice versa. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis show that if the partition
cells are nite, agents will agree on the posteriors after nite steps.
The setting in this paper is dierent in that agents update their awareness, not only
their information. The assumption is that agent  updates his awareness whenever he
hears an announcement that he cannot rationalize. This happens if none of the states he
considers possible describe that  would make such an announcement. In other words,
updating with the information revealed by the announcement yields the empty set. We
interpret this as the realization on the part of the agent that he is missing something.
His reaction is to increase his awareness until he can rationalize the announcement.
There are many ways in which 's awareness can increase. The only requirement we
impose is that the increase is minimal.
6.1 Updating process
Consider two agents,  and , with possibility correspondences P and P, respec-
tively. Recall that S0 =
V
S is the least expressive state space and that both agents
are aware of it. Consider the event A  S0. At each period t, both agents take turns
in announcing their posteriors about A.
At each period t a static model is dened where Pi
t is i's possibility correspondence
and where full state ! occurs. Set P
1 = P, P

0 = P. At t = 1,  announces
q
1(!) =
(P
1 (!) \ A

1 (!))
(P
1 (!))
:
This announcement reveals some public information. This information consists of the
states that would enable  to make such an announcement. Because agents have
dierent awareness, they perceive this public information dierently. More specically,
if an agent's state space is S, then he would perceive this public information as the set
1(S) =

! 2 S : q
1(!) =
(P
1 (!) \ A

1 (!))
(P
1 (!))

:
Reacting to the announcement, agent  updates his private information and aware-
ness. We only need to specify the updating process for states in 1(S), because only
these states are relevant after the announcement.11
Dene, for all ! 2 1(S), S 2 S,
1. If P

0 (!) \ 1(


0(!)) 6= ; then P

1 (!) = P

0 (!) \ 1(


0(!)).
This is the standard case of updating information only. If ! was the true state, then
P

0 (!) would be 's information. After hearing the announcement, he would update
11For ! 2 S n 1(S), P

1 (!) is dened in a arbitrary way, with the only requirement that P

1 satises the
ve properties outlined in section 3.
18by incorporating set 1(


0(!)), the public information revealed by the announcement.
As long as the intersection of these two sets is nonempty, agent  has no reason to
suspect that he is missing \something".
2. If P

0 (!)\1(


0(!)) = ; then P

1 (!) = (P

0 (!))S0 \1(S0) 6= ; for some minimal
S0 where 


0(!)  S0  S.12
This is the case where agent  realizes at ! that he is missing something. His
reaction is to update his awareness so that he can rationalize 's announcement. If he
updates to state space S0, then his new information is the enlargement of his old in-
formation to the new state space S0, intersected with the public information perceived
from state space S0, 1(S0). As long as this set is not empty, it rationalizes the an-
nouncement. Note that that for S0 = S and by Generalized Reexivity (nondelusion),
(P

0 (!))S0 \ 1(S0) 6= ;. Hence, such a S0 always exists.
Agent  announces
q

1(!) =
(P

1 (!) \ A


1(!))
(P

1 (!))
and the public information revealed, described in state space S, is given by
1(S) =

! 2 1(S) : q

1(!) =
(P

1 (!) \ A


1(!))
(P

1 (!))

:
At time t, agent  updates as follows. For all ! 2 t 1(S), S 2 S,
1. If P
t 1(!) \ t 1(

t 1(!)) 6= ; then P
t (!) = P
t 1(!) \ t 1(

t 1(!)).
2. If P
t 1(!)\t 1(

t 1(!)) = ; then P
t (!) = (P
t 1(!))S0 \t 1(S0) 6= ; for some
minimal S0 such that 

t 1(!)  S0  S.
He announces
q
t (!) =
(P
t (!) \ A

t (!))
(P
t (!))
and the public information revealed is
t(S) =

! 2 t 1(S) : q
t (!) =
(P
t (!) \ A

t (!))
(P
t (!))

:
For all ! 2 t(S), S 2 S,  updates as follows.
1. If P

t 1(!) \ t(


t 1(!)) 6= ; then P

t (!) = P

t 1(!) \ t(


t 1(!)).
2. If P

t 1(!) \ t(


t 1(!)) = ; then P

t (!) = (P

t 1(!))S0 \ t(S0) 6= ; for some
minimal S0 such that 


t 1(!)  S0  S.
12S0 is minimal in the sense that there does not exist S00  S0 such that (P

0 (!))S00 \ 1(S00) 6= ;. There
may exist many such minimal state spaces.
19Agent  announces
q

t (!) =
(P

t (!) \ A


t (!))
(P

t (!))
and the public information revealed is
t(S) =

! 2 t(S) : q

t (!) =
(P

t (!) \ A


t (!))
(P

t (!))

:
In general, t(S) or t(S) can be empty. In the example, when the fully aware
agent announces a posterior of 1 for the event \prices are high", 1(S0) is empty. If
t(S) is empty then no updating occurs at any state in S and k(S) remains empty
for all k  t.
Finally, we require that at every time t, P
t and P

t satisfy all properties outlined in
section 3. It is not true in general that for any given P and P, the updating process
yields at each t a pair P
t , P

t where the properties are satised. The reason is that
although the true state ! belongs to t(S) and t(S), this is not necessarily true
for t(S), t(S) where S  S. Hence, a less than fully aware agent may have a wrong
view of the public information revealed and hence update by excluding the true state.
But then, Generalized Reexivity is not satised. For agreement we need that unaware
agents do not have a wrong view of the information revealed by the announcement.
6.2 Reaching an agreement
The updating process described above species that the agents increase their awareness
when they hear an announcement that contradicts their beliefs. A crucial feature of
the process is that they are able to update as much as necessary (but no more than
that) in order to rationalize the other agent's announcement. The following Theorem
shows that agents reach an agreement eventually.
Theorem 5. There exists a nite t such that q
t (!) = q

t (!). Moreover, agent i
updates his awareness at t if and only if 
i
t 1(!)^

j
t 1(!)  
i
t(!)^

j
t 1(!), where
i;j = ;. Finally, suppose that whenever S0  S and !
S0 2 it(S0), we have !
S 2 it(S),
where i = ;. Then, for each t > 1, 

t (!) _ 


t (!) = 

t 1(!) _ 


t 1(!).
The two other results describe when and how agents update their awareness. The
second result shows that an agent updates his awareness if and only if he becomes
aware of something that the other agent was already aware of. This is the only way of
rationalizing the announcement. Eectively, this means that a necessary condition for
agreement is not that agents are really smart and can always increase their awareness,
but that they can work out what is going on inside the other agent's head. By putting
together two really smart people with totally dierent backgrounds it is not guaranteed
that they will eventually agree. Being able to understand how the other one thinks
is more important than having the means to increase your awareness in arbitrary
directions. One could say that agreement is more the result of similar backgrounds,
than unbounded rationality.
20Whereas the previous result places a lower bound on the updating of awareness,
the last part species an upper bound. Suppose that more expressive state spaces are
always better at describing the agents' announcements. That is, whenever the truth
(!) belongs to the public information described by S0, and S is more expressive, then
the truth also belongs to the public information described by S. This property is always
true when S = S, the full state space, but may fail otherwise. When the property is
true, then the \sum" (join) of the agents' awareness is constant across time. Hence,
whenever one updates his awareness, at most he can be aware of everything that the
other agent is aware of.
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. (1) =) (5) and (6). By denition, for any ! 2 S, ! 2
B1
S(P1(!)). From (1) we have ! 2 B2
S(P1(!)), which implies 
2(!)  
1(!)
and (P2(!))S  (P1(!))S. For the reverse direction, suppose that ! 2 B1
S(E).
Then, (P1(!))S  ES and E  
1(!). From (5) and (6) we immediately have that
! 2 B2
S(E).
That (1) implies (2) and (6) is immediate. For the reverse direction, (6) implies
that for all events E, B1
S(E)  A2
S(E), so (1) follows from (2).
(4) =) (2). Suppose ! 2 A2
S(E) \ B1
S(E). Then, P1(!)  E
1(!) which im-
plies P1(!)S(E)  E. Since E  S!  
1(!), we have P1(!)S!  (P1(!)S(E))S! 
ES!. This implies P2(!)S!  ES!. Since S!  
1(!), we have P2(!) 
(P2(!)S!)
1(!)  (ES!)
1(!) = E
1(!). Hence, ! 2 B2
S(E).
(2) =) (4). Suppose not. Then, there exists ! such that P2(!)S! * P1(!)S!.
Since both agents are aware of S!, we have that P1(!)  (P1(!)S!)
1(!) and
P2(!) * (P1(!)S!)
2(!). Hence, ! 2 A2
S(P1(!)S!) \ B1
S(P1(!)S!) but
! = 2 B2
S(P1(!)S!), a contradiction.
(5) =) (2) and (3). Suppose ! 2 B1
S(E) \ A2
S(E). Then, we have that
P1(!)S  ES, E  
1(!) and E  
2(!). From (5) we also have P2(!)S  ES,
which together with E  
2(!) imply P2(!)  E
2(!) and therefore ! 2 B2
S(E).
Suppose now that ! 2 B1
S(E) \ :A2
S(E), which implies that P1(!)S  ES. Let
E0 = P2(!). Then, from (5) we have E0
S  ES and ! 2 B2
S(E0).
For the reverse direction, x ! 2 S. If 
1(!)  
2(!) then we have ! 2
B1
S(P1(!)) \ A2
S(P1(!)). From (2) we have ! 2 B2
S(P1(!)), which implies
P2(!)S  P1(!)S. If 
1(!)  
2(!) then ! 2 B1
S(P1(!)) \ :A2
S(P1(!)).
Then, there exists E0 such that ! 2 B2
S(E0) and E0
S  P1(!)S. But ! 2 B2
S(E0)
implies P2(!)S  E0
S, so we have P2(!)S  P1(!)S.
Proof of rst part of Theorem 1. Suppose f is optimal for (C;;P1;u;) and g is op-
timal for (C;;P2;u;). Fix ! 2 S with (!) > 0. For all c 2 C, we have
X
!2P2(!)
u(g(!);!)j
2(!)(!) 
X
!2P2(!)
u(c;!)j
2(!)(!):
21Conditional independence and generalized reexivity imply that for !;!0 2 P2(!)
such that j
2(!)(!), j
2(!)(!0) > 0, we have
(E2(!) \ !S)
j
2(!)(!)
=
(E2(!) \ !0
S)
j
2(!)(!0)
> 0:
Multiplying by that number we have that for all c 2 C,
X
!2P2(!)
u(g(!);!)(E2(!) \ !S) 
X
!2P2(!)
u(c;!)(E2(!) \ !S) =)
X
!2P2(!)
u(g(!);!)
X
!
12E2(!)\!S
(!
1) 
X
!2P2(!)
u(c;!)
X
!
12E2(!)\!S
(!
1):
Since f!
1gS0 = !S0 for all !
1 2 !S we have
X
!2P2(!)
X
!
12E2(!)\!S
u(g(!);!
1)(!
1) 
X
!2P2(!)
X
!
12E2(!)\!S
u(c;!
1)(!
1) =)
X
!
12(P2(!))S\E2(!)
u(g(!);!
1)(!
1) 
X
!
12(P2(!))S\E2(!)
u(c;!
1)(!
1):
Hence, conditional independence implies that for any ! 2 S, the agent's best
action at P2(!) is also the best action at (P2(!))S \ E2(!). Next, we show that
the full state space S is partitioned by

(P2(!))S \ E2(!)
	
!2S :
Suppose !
1 2 (P2(!))S \ E2(!). Then, 
2(!) = 
2(!
1) and f!
1g
2(!) 2 P2(!).
Generalized Reexivity implies f!
1g
2(!) 2 P2(!
1) and Stationarity implies P2(!
1) =
P2(f!
1g
2(!)) = P2(!). Hence, (P2(!
1))S \ E2(!
1) = (P2(!))S \ E2(!).
We also show that !
1, !
2 2 (P2(!))S \ E2(!) implies g(!
1) = g(!
2). Since

2(!
1) = 
2(!
2) = 
2(!), Stationarity implies that either P2(!
1) = P2(!) or
P2(!
1) \ P2(!) = ;. Generalized Reexivity and !
1 2 (P2(!))S imply P2(!
1) =
P2(!). Similarly for !
2, so we have P2(!
1) = P2(!
2). Hence, g(!
1) = g(!
2). The
same argument shows that !
1, !
2 2 (P1(!))S \ E1(!) implies f(!
1) = f(!
2).
We showed that for each element of the partition

(P2(!))S \ E2(!)
	
!2S,
agent 2 picks an action that maximizes his expected utility. Moreover, agent 1 picks
one action for each element of the partition,

(P1(!))S \ E1(!)
	
!2S. This action
may not necessarily be optimal.
Finally, we need to show that the former partition is ner than the latter if and
only if agent 2 is strongly more informed. One direction is obvious, so for the other
direction suppose !
1 2 (P2(!))S \ E2(!). Then, !
1 2 (P2(!))S and Station-
arity, together with PPI, implies 
1(!
1)  
1(!). Suppose 
1(!
1)  
1(!).
Then, ! = 2 (P1(!
1))S, which implies ! = 2 (P2(!
1))S. But this contradicts the
fact that

(P2(!))S \ E2(!)
	
!2S is a partition. Hence, 
1(!
1) = 
1(!) and
!
1 2 (P1(!))S \ E1(!). Note that if the agent is always more aware and weakly
more informed, then he is strongly more informed.
22The main example shows that if conditional independence is violated but the agent
is strongly more informed, then he may be worse o. In Example 1, the agent satises
conditional independence, he is weakly (but not strongly) more informed and he is
strictly worse o.
The proof of the second part of Theorem 1 is given in three steps. First, using
P2 we dene a possibility correspondence P : S ! 2S
and show that it satises
non-delusion, KTYK and nested, three properties which are discussed in Geanakoplos
(1989). Then, we show that if g is optimal for P2 then it is also optimal for P in a
suitably dened problem in the Geanakoplos' setting. Finally, we apply Theorem 1 in
Geanakoplos (1989).
Dene the mapping P : S ! 2S
such that for all ! 2 S, P(!) = (P2(!))S.
We show that P also satises the following three properties, discussed in Geanakoplos
(1989):
Denition 15.
 Non-Delusion For all ! 2 S, ! 2 P(!).
 KTYK !
1 2 P(!) =) P(!
1)  P(!).
 Nested For any !, !
1 2 S, either P(!) \ P(!
1) = ;, or P(!)  P(!
1) or
P(!
1)  P(!).
Lemma 2. Suppose that P2 satises nested awareness. Then, the possibility corre-
spondence P satises non-delusion, KTYK and nested.
Proof. P satises non-delusion because P2 satises Generalized Reexivity. For KTYK,
suppose !
1 2 P(!) = (P2(!))S. Then, f!
1g
2(!) 2 P2(!). Stationarity im-
plies P2(f!
1g
2(!)) = P2(!). PPI implies (P2(!
1))S  (P2(f!
1g
2(!)))S =
(P2(!))S. Hence P(!
1)  P(!).
For nested, suppose P(!) \ P(!
1) 6= ;. Take !
2 2 P(!) \ P(!
1). Then !
2 2
(P2(!))S\(P2(!
1))S. As in the previous paragraph, this implies that P2(f!
2g
2(!
1)) =
P2(!
1) and P2(f!
2g
2(!)) = P2(!). Without loss of generality, suppose that 
2(!) 

2(!
1). PPI implies that (P2(f!
2g
2(!
1)))S  (P2(f!
2g
2(!)))S and hence, P(!
1) 
P(!).
The setting in Geanakoplos (1989) species a nite state space S, a possibility
correspondence P : S ! 2S
and an action set C. Let u : C  S ! R and let  be a
measure on S.
Denition 16. In the Geanakoplos' setting, a decision function f : S ! C is optimal
for the decision problem (C;S;P;u;) i
 P(!) = P(!
1) =) f(!) = f(!
1)
 For all ! 2 S and c 2 C,
X
!
12P(!)
u(f(!);!
1)(!
1) 
X
!
12P(!)
u(c;!
1)(!
1)
23Given a decision problem (C;;P2;u;) we dene the decision problem (C;S;P;u0;)
in the setting of Geanakoplos (1989). The possibility correspondence P : S ! 2S
is
such that for all ! 2 S, P(!) = (P2(!))S. The utility function u0 : C  S ! R
is dened such that u0(c;!) = u(c;!
S0) for all ! 2 S, for all c 2 C.
Lemma 3. Decision function g is optimal for (C;;P2;u;) if and only if g is optimal
for (C;S;P;u0;).
Proof. First we show that for any !, !
1 2 S, P2(!) = P2(!
1) () (P2(!))S =
(P2(!
1))S. One direction is obvious so for the other suppose that (P2(!))S =
(P2(!
1))S. Since ! 2 (P2(!
1))S we have !

2(!
1) 2 P2(!
1), which implies P2(!

2(!
1)) =
P2(!
1). PPI implies P2(!)"  P2(!

2(!
1))" = P2(!
1)". Similarly, since !
1 2
(P2(!))S, we have P2(!)" = P2(!
1)", which implies P2(!) = P2(!
1).
If g is optimal for the rst problem, then for any ! 2 S and any c 2 C,
X
!2P2(!)
u(g(!);!S0)(!S) 
X
!2P2(!)
u(c;!S0)(!S):
Fix ! 2 S and take ! 2 P2(!). For any !
1 2 !S, we have that u0(g(!);!
1) =
u(g(!);f!
1gS0) = u(g(!);!S0). We also have that (!S) =
P
!
12!S
(!
1). Combin-
ing these two we have
X
!2P2(!)
X
!
12!S
u0(g(!);!
1)(!
1) 
X
!2P2(!)
X
!
12!S
u0(c;!
1)(!
1);
which is equivalent to
X
!
12(P2(!))S
u0(g(!);!
1)(!
1) 
X
!
12(P2(!))S
u0(c;!
1)(!
1):
Since P(!) = (P2(!))S, g is optimal for the second problem in the Geanakoplos'
setting. The other direction is similar.
The following theorem is proved in Geanakoplos (1989).
Theorem 6 ( Geanakoplos (1989)). Let P satisfy non-delusion, nested and KTYK. Let
R be a partition of S that is a coarsening of P. Let g, f be optimal for (C;S;P;u0;)
and (C;S;R;u0;) respectively. Then,
X
!2S
u0(g(!);!)(!) 
X
!2S
u0(f(!);!)(!):
Proof of the second part of Theorem 1. Suppose f is optimal for (C;;P1;u;) and g
is optimal for (C;;P2;u;). Dene Q : S ! 2S
such that Q(!) = P1(!)S \
E1(!). Since P1 satises conditional independence, we believe from the proof of the
rst part of Theorem 1 that Q partitions the full state space and that f is optimal for
(C;S;Q;u0;). Dene P : S ! 2S
such that for all ! 2 S, P(!) = (P2(!))S.
By Lemma 2, P satises non-delusion, nested and KTYK. Since E2(!)  E1(!) for
24all ! 2 S and P2 is strongly more informed than P1, we have that P is ner than
Q. By applying Lemma 3, g is optimal for (C;S;P;u0;). By Theorem 6, g attains a
higher ex ante expected utility than what f attains.
The main example shows that if the less informed agent does not satisfy conditional
independence while the awareness of the strongly more informed agent is nested and
more informative, then he may be worse o. In the appendix and with examples 1, 2
and 3 we show that agent 2 can be worse o if, respectively, strongly more informed,
nested awareness, informed awareness fail but all other properties hold.
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that P2 is not weakly more informed than P1. Then,
there exist !;!1 such that !1 2 P2(!)S, !1 = 2 P1(!)S, where S = 
1(!)^
2(!).
Let !2 2 P2(!) be such that !2S = !1. By Generalized Reexivity and since !1 = 2
P1(!)S, we have that !1 6= !
S, which implies that !2 6= !

2(!). By non-degeneracy of
P2, !2S0 6= !
S0. By Generalized Reexivity, !
S 2 P2(!)S;P1(!)S. Let C = fc1;c2g
and consider the following payos: u(c1;!
S0) =  1, u(c1;!2S0) = 1:1, u(c2;!
S0) = 8,
u(c2;!2S0) =  8.
Let (!) = 1=2 and (!
2) = 1=2, where !
2
2(!) = !2. At !, 2's optimal action
is c1, while 1's optimal action is c2. At !
2, from Generalized Reexivity, both agents
assign probability at least 1=2 to state !2S and their optimal action is c1. Hence, the
decision problem (C;;P1;u;) is more valuable than (C;;P2;u;), a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose there is a common prior , there are bets bi : S0 ! R,
i 2 I, and an event E such that S0  E, and for each ! 2 E, all agents expect
positive gains from their respective bets. Suppose that at ! 2 S, event E is common
belief and E  
^(!), which is the common state space at !.13 Since we have
assumed that S is nite, Theorem 3 in Galanis (2007) states that there is a public
event E  
^(!) such that !

^(!)  E  E. The proof of Theorem 4 in Galanis
(2007) shows that E is partitioned by Pi, for each i. By adding up we have that for each
i,
P
!2E
j
(!)bi(!S0) > 0. By adding over all agents we have
P
!2E
j
(!)
P
i2I
bi(!S0) > 0.
Since
P
i2I
bi(!S0) = 0 for all ! 2 E, we have a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose there is a common prior . Fix agent i and a state
! 2 S such that (!) > 0. Then, (Pi(!)) > 0 and
P
!2Pi(!)
bi(!S0)j
i(!)(!) > 0.
Conditional independence and generalized reexivity imply that for !;!0 2 Pi(!)
such that j
i(!)(!), j
i(!)(!0) > 0, we have
(Ei(!) \ !S)
j
i(!)(!)
=
(Ei(!) \ !0
S)
j
i(!)(!0)
> 0:
13For denition of the common state space 
^(!), look at Galanis (2007)
25Multiplying by that number we have that,
X
!2Pi(!)
bi(!S0)(Ei(!) \ !S) > 0 =)
X
!2Pi(!)
bi(!S0)
X
!
12Ei(!)\!S
(!
1) > 0:
Since f!
1gS0 = !S0 for all !
1 2 !S we have
X
!2Pi(!)
X
!
12Ei(!)\!S
bi(f!
1gS0)(!
1) > 0 =)
X
!
12(Pi(!))S\Ei(!)
bi(f!
1gS0)(!
1) > 0:
From the proof of the rst part of Theorem 1 we believe that

(Pi(!))S \ Ei(!)
	
!2S
generates a partition of S. By adding all elements of the partition we have that
X
!2S
bi(f!gS0)(!
1) > 0:
By adding all agents and since
P
i2I
bi(!) = 0 for each ! 2 S0, we derive the contradiction.
For the last claim of the theorem, the counter example is provided in example 4.
Proof of Theorem 4. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3 in Geanakoplos
(1989). Let ffjgj2J be an equilibrium and look at i's one agent decision problem that
is induced when the strategy of each j 6= i is xed. Because of PPOP, assumption 1 is
satised. If agent i was fully aware but had no information at all, his optimal action
would be zi and his ex ante payo would be  ui. Since agent i is strongly more informed,
his awareness is more informative, and satises either nested awareness or conditional
independence, by Theorem 1, his ex ante payo is weakly higher than  ui. Since this is
true for all agents, by hypothesis, fi(!) = zi, for all ! 2 S, for all i 2 I.
Proof of Theorem 5. Note that for each S, 1(S)  1(S)  :::t(S)  t(S)  :::
Moreover, t(S);t(S) 6= ; for all t. Since the union of all state spaces  is nite,
there exists t such that t(S) = t(S) for all S 2 S. Consider a state space S such that
t(S) = t(S) 6= ; and S0  S implies t(S0) = t(S0) = ;. Such a S exists because of
the niteness of . We then have that for all ! 2 t(S), P
t (!), P

t (!)  t(S). That
is, t(S) = t(S) is partitioned by P
t and P

t . By adding up, we have that
(t(S))q

t (!) = (t(S) \ AS):
(t(S))q
t (!) = (t(S) \ AS):
Hence, q
t (!) = q

t (!). Note that both agents may be more aware than S.
For the second claim, if 

t 1(!)^


t 1(!)  

t (!)^


t 1(!) then 

t 1(!) 


t (!) and  updates at t. Suppose that at t agent  updates his awareness, so that
26

t 1(!)  

t (!) = S. Suppose that it is not the case that 

t 1(!) ^ 


t 1(!) 


t (!) ^ 


t 1(!). Because 

t 1(!)  

t (!) and 

t 1(!) ^ 


t 1(!)  

t (!) ^



t 1(!), we must have 

t 1(!)^


t 1(!)  

t (!)^


t 1(!). Hence, 

t 1(!)^



t 1(!) = 

t (!) ^ 


t 1(!) = S ^ 


t 1(!)  S0.
We next show that P

t 1(!
S) = P

t 1(!
S0). Since S0  S and from Projections
Preserve Ignorance, 


t 1(!
S)  


t 1(!
S0). Also, 


t 1(!)  


t 1(!
S) implies S0 =



t 1(!) ^ S  


t 1(!
S) ^ S = 


t 1(!
S). Again by PPI, we have 


t 1(!
S0) 



t 1(!



t 1(!
S)) = 


t 1(!
S). The last equality holds from Generalized Reexivity
and Stationarity. Finally, Stationarity and 


t 1(!
S) = 


t 1(!
S0) imply P

t 1(!
S) =
P

t 1(!
S0).
Because 

t 1(!) rationalizes 's announcement at t 2, we have that !


t 1(!) 2
t 2(

t 1(!)). Moreover, !


t 1(!) 2 t 1(

t 1(!)) because P
t 1(!) = P
t 1(!


t 1(!)).
Because S  

t 1(!)  S0 we have 


t 1(!
S)  


t 1(!


t 1(!))  


t 1(!
S0). Hence,



t 1(!
S) = 


t 1(!


t 1(!)) = 


t 1(!
S0) and P

t 1(!
S) = P

t 1(!


t 1(!)) = P

t 1(!
S0).
This implies that !


t 1(!) 2 t 1(

t 1(!)). But then, P
t 1(!)\t 1(

t 1(!)) 6= ;,
contradicting that  updates at t.
For the third claim, suppose that at t agent  updates his awareness, so that


t 1(!)  

t (!) = S. Dene S0 = (S ^ 


t 1(!)) _ 

t 1(!). From Lemma 6.1 in
Davey and Priestley (1990) we have S0 = (S^


t 1(!))_

t 1(!)  (S_

t 1(!))^
(

t 1(!) _ 


t 1(!)) = S ^ (


t 1(!) _ 

t 1(!))  

t 1(!) _ 


t 1(!). Hence,
S0 _


t 1(!)  

t 1(!)_


t 1(!). Moreover, S0 _


t 1(!)  

t 1(!)_


t 1(!).
We next show that 


t 1(!
S) = 


t 1(!
S0). Since S0  S and from Projections Pre-
serve Ignorance, 


t 1(!
S)  


t 1(!
S0). Also, 


t 1(!)  


t 1(!
S) implies 


t 1(!)^
S  


t 1(!
S) ^ S = 


t 1(!
S) and S0 = (


t 1(!) ^ S) _ 

t 1(!)  


t 1(!
S) _


t 1(!)  


t 1(!
S). Again by PPI, we have 


t 1(!
S0)  


t 1(!



t 1(!
S)) = 


t 1(!
S).
The last equality holds from Generalized Reexivity and Stationarity. Finally, Station-
arity and 


t 1(!
S) = 


t 1(!
S0) imply P

t 1(!
S) = P

t 1(!
S0).
Because S rationalizes 's announcement at t 1 and from Generalized Reexivity
we have that
q

t 1(!) =
(P

t 1(!
S) \ A


t 1(!
S))
(P

t 1(!
S))
:
From the proof of the second claim we have that !


t 1(!) 2 t 1(

t 1(!)), which
implies (because 

t 1(!)  S0) that !
S0 2 t 1(S0). Because P

t 1(!
S) = P

t 1(!
S0)
and S  S0 is minimal, we have S = S0. Hence, 

t (!) _ 


t 1(!) = 

t 1(!) _



t 1(!). With similar arguments we can show for agent  that 

t (!) _ 


t (!) =


t (!) _ 


t 1(!). Hence, 

t 1(!) _ 


t 1(!) = 

t (!) _ 


t (!).
27B Counter examples
Example 1. Both agents satisfy conditional independence, agent 2 is weakly (but not
strongly) more informed, his awareness is nested and more informative and he is strictly
worse o. There are two basic questions, q and r. Agent 2 is only aware of the
rst question, while agent 1 is always fully aware. Since both agents have constant
awareness, they satisfy conditional independence and nested awareness. Agent 1 always
learns the answer to the question r, while both never learn the answer to question q.
There are two state spaces, S = f!
1;!
2;!
3;!
4g,
!
1 = (qy;rn); (!
1) = 3=8;
!
2 = (qn;ry) (!
2) = 3=8;
!
3 = (qy;ry); (!
3) = 1=8;
!
4 = (qn;rn); (!
4) = 1=8;
and S0 = f!1;!2g, where !1 = (qy) and !2 = (qn). There are two actions, B and NB.
We have u(!1;NB) = 1, u(!1;B) = 1, u(!2;NB) = 1, u(!2;B) =  1. Agent 2 has
the trivial partition, so for all ! 2 S [ S0, P2(!) = f!1;!2g. Agent 1's possibility
correspondence is as follows:
P1(!
1) = P2(!
4) = f!
1;!
4g;
P1(!
2) = P2(!
3) = f!
2;!
3g;
P1(!1) = P2(!2) = f!1;!2g:
Agent 2 is indierent between both actions and his expected utility is 0. Agent 1 chooses
action B at !
1, !
4 and action NB at !
2, !
3. His expected utility is 1/2.
Example 2. In this example agent 2 is strictly worse o although he is is strongly
more informed, his awareness is more informed but not nested and he fails conditional
independence, whereas agent 1 satises conditional independence.
The setting is similar to that of the main example. The are three basic questions
p, q and r. Agent 1 is always fully aware but has no information. Hence, he satises
conditional independence. The full state space S contains three states:
!
1 = (pl;qy;rn); (!
1) = 0:3;
!
2 = (pm;qn;ry); (!
2) = 0:3:
!
3 = (ph;qy;ry); (!
3) = 0:4;
There are three other state spaces: S1 = f!1;!2;!3g which lacks the r dimension,
S2 = f!4;!5;!6g which lacks the q dimension, and S3 = f!7;!8;!9g which lacks both
q and r. For example, !1 = (pl;qy), !5 = (pm;ry) and !9 = (ph).
Agent 2 is always aware of p. He is aware of q at !
1, !
3 and he is aware of r
at !
2, !
3. His information is as follows: P2(!
1) = f!1;!3g, P2(!
2) = f!5;!6g,
P2(!
1) = f!
1g.
28The payos and actions are the same as in the main example. Action B yields 1
if ph and 0 otherwise, while action NB yields 0 always. Agent 1 has no information
so his optimal action is NB, and his ex ante expected utility is 0. Agent 2 chooses B
always and his ex ante expected utility is -0.2.
Example 3. Agent 2 is strongly more informed, his awareness is nested but not more
informed and he violates conditional independence. Agent 1 satises conditional inde-
pendence and he is strictly better o.
There are two state spaces, S0 = f!1;!2;!3;!4g, S = f!
1;!
2;!
3;!
4g, where
S0  S. Each !
i projects to !i. Agent 1's information is such that P1(!
i ) =
P1(!i) = f!
1;!
2;!
3g for i = 1;2;3, P1(!
4) = P1(!4) = f!4g. For agent 2 we have
P2(!
1) = P2(!1) = P2(!2) = f!1;!2g, P2(!
2) = f!
2g, P2(!
3) = P2(!3) = f!3g,
P2(!
4) = P2(!4) = f!4g. There are two actions, B and NB. Action B yields 1 at
!2, -1 at !1, !3, and 0 at !4. Action NB yields 0 always. The prior  is dened as:
(!
1) = 0:3, (!
2) = 0:35, (!
3) = 0:3, (!
4) = 0:05. Agent 1 chooses NB always
and his ex ante expected utility is 0.25. Agent 2 chooses B at !
1, !
2 and !
4 and NB
at !
3. His ex ante expected utility is 0.05.
Example 4. We present an example with two agents whose priors satisfy conditional
independence, they have no common prior, non-degeneracy is satised and there is no
trade that ensures positive expected gains at each full state, for both. There are two state
spaces, S = f!
1;!
2;!
3;!
4g and S0 = f!1;!2g, such that S0  S, !
1S0 = !
2S0 = !1
and !
3S0 = !
4S0 = !2. Agent 1 is always fully aware and P1(!) = S for all
! 2 S. His prior 1 on S is (1=8;1=2;2=8;1=8). In fact, this is the only prior
that can generate his posteriors. Agent 2's possibility correspondence is as follows:
P2(!
1) = P2(!
4) = S0, P2(!
2) = f!
2g, P2(!
3) = f!
3g. His prior assigns 1=4 to each
! 2 S. Since 1 cannot generate 2's posteriors, the agents have no common priors.
Moreover, the agents' priors satisfy conditional independence. Suppose there is a trade
bi : S0 ! R;i = 1;2, such that
P
!2
i(!)
ti(!;!)bi(!S0) > 0, for each ! 2 S, for each
i. For agent 2 this means that b2(!1);b2(!2) > 0. But since
P
i2I
bi(!) = 0 for each
! 2 S0, we have b1(!1);b1(!2) < 0, which implies
P
!2
1(!
1)
t1(!
1;!)b1(!S0) < 0.
Example 5. This is an example of common belief trade and common priors, within
the standard model and with non partitional information structures. There are three
states f!1;!2;!3g and the prior is such that (!1);(!3) = 1=4. (!2) = 1=2. There
are two agents. Agent 1 has the trivial partition P1(!) = 
 for all ! 2 
. For
agent 2 we have P2(!1) = P2(!2) = f!1;!2g, P2(!3) = f!2;!3g. Consider the trade
b1(!1) = b1(!3) = 1=4, b1(!2) =  3=16, b2 =  b1. At each state ! 2 
, both agents
expect positive gains. Hence, this is always common belief.
Example 6. This is an example of an information structure P2 that is not strongly
more informed than P1, S0 is non degenerate for both P1 and 2, but for any u, , C,
decision problem (C;;P2;u;) is more valuable than (C;;P1;u;). There are four
state spaces, S0 = f!g, S1 = f!1;!2g, S2 = f!3;!4g and S = f!
1;!
2;!
3;!
4g. All
states project to !. Moreover, P1(!
1) = P1(!
2) = f!1g, P1(!
3) = P1(!
4) = f!2g,
29P2(!
1) = P1(!
3) = f!3g, P2(!
2) = P1(!
4) = f!4g. Neither P1 or P2 is strongly
more informed. Moreover, S0 is degenerate for both P1 and P2 because each agent
always considers only one state to be possible. Yet, for any any u, , C, decision
problem (C;;P2;u;) is more valuable as (C;;P1;u;).
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